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2Abstract
The distinction between semantics (linguistically-encoded meaning) and pragmatics 
(inferences about communicative intentions) can often be unclear and counter-intuitive.  For 
example, linguistic theories argue that the meaning of some encompasses the meaning of all 
while the intuition that some implies not all results from an inference.  We explored how online 
interpretation of some evolves using an eye-tracking while listening paradigm.  Early eye-
movements indicated that while some was initially interpreted as compatible with all, 
participants began excluding referents compatible with all approximately 800ms later.  These 
results contrast with recent evidence of immediate inferencing and highlight the presence of 
bottom-up semantic-pragmatic interactions which necessarily rely on initial access to lexical 
meanings to trigger inferences.  
Keywords: semantics, pragmatics, scalar implicature, quantifiers
Semantics-pragmatics interface 3
3Imagine overhearing the following conversation:
(1)    Mother: Did you finish the ice cream sandwiches?
    Child: I ate some of them.  
Now suppose that you know that the child had in fact polished off the frozen novelties.  Did she 
lie?  Logicians would be inclined to say no – the child’s statement is logically consistent with the 
fact that she ate all of the ice cream sandwiches.  Ask the mother, however, and she would most 
likely disagree – if the child says she ate some of them, she is indicating that she didn’t eat all of 
them.  Who is correct in this situation?  
The philosopher Paul Grice (1975) would have said that both of them are.  He argued for a 
division between interpretations that emerge from the meanings of words (semantics) and those 
that depend on inferential analysis of the speaker’s communicative goals (pragmatics).  This 
distinction sheds light on why terms like some have two different interpretations (Horn, 1989; 
Gadzar, 1979).  The logician’s answer depends on the semantics of the quantifier whose referents 
include the stronger term on the same scale (some and possibly all).  In contrast, the likely 
interpretation from the mother’s point of view incorporates a pragmatic inference called a scalar 
implicature which imposes an additional upper-boundary that excludes referents compatible with 
the maximal term (some but not all).  This interpretation is motivated by the expectation that if 
the child had eaten all of the frozen novelties, she would have simply said so, but since she did 
not, she must have eaten only a subset of them.  
Scalar implicatures are both frequent and robust in everyday speech, thus it might seem 
unlikely that listeners would ever entertain the less common and less precise semantic meaning. 
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4Considerations such as these have led some to posit that these inferences are stored in the lexicon 
(Levinson, 2000) or generated directly by the grammar (Chierchia, 2004).  This view is also 
consistent with empirical findings demonstrating listeners’ rapid use of contextual cues to infer 
the speaker’s intent (Sedivy, Tanenhaus, Chambers, & Carlson, 1999).  Evidence of this kind has 
been so persuasive that it has become increasingly implausible that any well-practiced process 
would show measurable delays (Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995; 
Altmann & Kamide, 2004).  
Recent data however suggest that scalar implicature may involve a slower, more effortful 
process (Noveck & Posada, 2003; De Neys & Schaeken, 2007).  Bott and Noveck (2004) 
compared the response times for truth-value judgments of sentences like “Some elephants are 
mammals” and found that participants who spontaneously generated the implicature (judged the 
statement to be false) took longer than those who interpreted the statement according to its 
semantic meaning (judged it to be true).  Huang and Snedeker (2009a) explored the nature of this 
temporal delay by presenting participants with instructions like “Point to the girl that has some of 
the socks” and monitoring their eye-movements to displays featuring a girl with 2 of 4 socks and 
another with 3 of 3 soccer balls.  This procedure features a critical period of ambiguity at the 
onset of the quantiﬁer where the semantics of some is compatible with both characters.  This 
ambiguity could be immediately resolved by calculating a scalar implicature to restrict 
interpretation to the girl with the subset of items.  Instead, participants’ reference resolution 
following some was substantially delayed, suggesting a temporal lag between semantic 
processing and the calculation of the pragmatic inference.  
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5Nevertheless, the presence of a delay in calculating the scalar implicature meant that this 
study failed to ﬁnd clear evidence that participants ever calculated the inference online, raising 
questions about the sensitivity of the task.  Furthermore, more recent studies adopting a similar 
paradigm have failed to ﬁnd temporal discrepancies between semantic and pragmatic processing 
(Grodner, Klein, Carbary, & Tanenhaus, in press; Breheny, 2009).  Thus this present study 
borrows the methods established by Huang and Snedeker (2009a) but seeks evidence for the 
hypothesized switch from a bare semantic analysis to a pragmatically-enriched one.  By 
contrasting pairs of compound nouns as potential referents (e.g., ice cream sandwiches vs. ice 
cream cones), we can extend the period of semantic ambiguity and ascertain when scalar 
implicatures occurs.
Methods
Twenty English-speaking undergraduates sat before an inclined podium with shelves in 
each quadrant and a camera at the center to record their direction of gaze.  On every trial, the 
experimenter acted out a story in which two sets of items were divided among four characters.  
These stories were followed by auditory instructions like (2). 
(2)    Point to the girl that has some/two/all/three of the ice cream sandwiches.
The number trials served as controls to ensure that any delay in reference resolution for some 
compared to all could not be attributed to a preference to look at larger sets.  Since these terms 
do not require a pragmatic inference to restrict reference, they do not generate the same 
temporary ambiguity as some.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The visual displays featured characters arranged so that the vertically-adjacent characters 
matched in gender while the horizontally-adjacent characters did not (Figure 1).  For some and 
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6all trials, one set of four items was split between a horizontally-adjacent pair (boy-with-2 vs. 
girl-with-2) and another set of three items was given to one of the remaining children (boy-
with-0 vs. girl-with-3).  For two and three trials, the first set was again evenly split between one 
boy-girl pair while the second set now included four items which were split unevenly between a 
second pair (boy-with-1 vs. girl-with-3).  This difference between the number and quantiﬁer 
trials was necessary to ensure that the partitive construction was felicitous for all trial types but it 
did not change the visual properties of the potential Targets.
(A)                       (B)
       
(C)                       (D)
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Figure 1: Examples of visual-world displays for (A) some, (B) two, (C) all, and (D) three trials.  
Participants here were instructed to “Point to the girl that has ____ of the ice cream sandwiches.”  
The girl with ice cream sandwiches was the Target while the girl with ice cream cones was the 
Distractor.  
The critical utterances differed only in the gender of the child that was requested and the 
identity of the final word.  The character who was requested was called the Target (girl-with-ice-
cream-sandwiches) while the one who matched in gender but had a different item was called the 
Distractor (girl-with-ice-cream-cones).  The names of the two items were always compound 
nouns that shared the same two-syllable onset.  Each of the 16 items was rotated through the four 
quantifier conditions across four presentation lists such that each list contained four items in each 
condition and each item appeared once in every list.
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8To determine the earliest point in the utterance at which the Target could logically be 
indentiﬁed (assuming no processing delays), we conducted two separate off-line gated-listening 
tasks with additional groups of participants.  To establish the length of period of ambiguity 
between the compound noun pairs, we presented 16 participants with 100ms incremental 
segments of the audio instructions (Tyler & Wessels, 1983).  After each segment, they were 
asked to indicate whether they heard the Target or Distractor word.  Participants correctly 
disambiguated the utterance at above chance levels 1400ms after quantifier onset (M=77%; all 
p’s<.01). 
This extended window also allows us to more rigorously test accounts favoring early scalar 
implicatures by mapping the time-course of on-line processing onto the phonological markers 
associated with inferencing in an off-line task.  To determine how much phonological 
information is necessary to derive a scalar implicature, we presented 20 participants with the 
relevant stories/displays and phrasal increments of the critical utterance (“Point-to-the-girl-that-
has-some/two/all/three | of-the | ice-cream | sandwiches”).  Each of the 16 items was rotated 
through the four continuation conditions across four presentation lists such that each list 
contained four items in each condition and each item appeared once in every list.  After each 
segment, they were asked to select the character that corresponded to what they had heard and 
saw.  Selections of the Target were above chance in the first segment across all quantifiers 
(M=91%; all p’s<.05), indicating that our materials were successful in establishing expectations 
that (1) quantifiers would refer specifically to the sets in the display, (2) objects would be 
identified by basic-level labels, and (3) some would be interpreted with a scalar implicature.  
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9Our critical question concerns the timing of semantic and pragmatic processing during real-
time comprehension.  If scalar implicatures are immediately calculated following the onset of the 
quantifier, we should expect reference restriction via the inference to be time-locked to this 
moment.  If instead the inference is preceded by prior semantic analysis of the quantified 
expression, then we might expect delays in looks to the referent to persist beyond this point.  
Results
Eye movements were coded by noting each change in gaze direction towards one of the 
quadrants or the center (Snedeker & Trueswell, 2004).  Twenty-ﬁve percent of the trials were 
checked by second coder who conﬁrmed the direction of ﬁxation for 95% of the frames.  Our 
dependent measure was looking time to the Target as a proportion of looking time to the Target 
and Distractor.  Looks to the other characters accounted for less than 5% of ﬁxations after onset 
of the gender cue. Each time window was analyzed with ANOVAs with quantiﬁer Scale (number 
vs. scalar) and Strength (lesser vs. greater) as within-subject and item variables and list/item 
group as a between-subjects and items variable.     
We ﬁrst examined ﬁxations from the onset of the gender cue to the onset of the quantifier 
(“girl that has”) to compare baseline looks to the Target and Distractor before the influence of the 
quantifier.  During this period, Target looks remained around chance for all terms, leading to no 
reliable effects of Scale or Strength (all p’s>.15).  We then examined Target fixations for 100ms 
intervals beginning from the onset of the quantifier to the point where the compound noun was 
phonologically disambiguated (Figure 2).  For the some trials, this defined a 1400ms period of 
semantic ambiguity.  Each time window is labeled by its onset relative to the quantifier. 
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10Figure 2: The time-course of looks to target for the four trial types 
We found that Target fixations in the three trials rose above chance during the initial 200ms 
time window (67%; t1(19)=3.45,p<.01; t2(15)=3.71,p<.01) while those in the two (63%; t1(19)
=2.87,p<.05; t2(15)=3.45,p<.01) and all trials (66%; t1(19)=3.13,p<.01; t2(15)=4.75,p<. 01) 
quickly followed in the 300ms window.  Since saccadic eye-movements take up to 200ms to be 
programmed after the relevant marker in the speech stream (Matin, Shao & Boff, 1993), these 
results indicate that the semantics of these terms was used to restrict reference at the earliest 
moments of language processing.  In contrast, Target looks for the some trials did not reliably 
exceed chance until the 1100ms window (63%; t1(19)=2.13,p<.05; t2(15)=1.88,p<.10).1  
Participants initially looked equally at both characters, suggesting that the scalar implicature was 
not available to rule out the Distractor during this early period of processing.  The difference in 
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1 Due to the relatively small number of items used, some effects that were robust in the subjects 
analysis failed to reach conventional levels of significance in the items analysis.Target fixations across these four terms led to a significant Scale by Strength interaction from the 
400ms (F1(1,16)=5.06,p<.05; F2(1,15)=8.47,p<.05) through the 1100ms window (F1(1,16)= 
5.39,p<.05; F2(1,15)=4.16,p<.10).  
To determine when the scalar implicature reliably occurred, we conducted a second analysis 
examining the saccades that occurred during each time window, rather than the fixations.  This 
allows us to isolate the point at which new eye-movements to the Target outnumber those to the 
Distractor. We separated the trials based on the object that the participant was initially fixating on 
in the previous frame of a critical 200ms time window (the Target or Distractor) and calculated 
the probability of switching to the other object during that period (Table 1).  
Table 1:  The percentage of switches to the Target as opposed to the percentage of switches off 
the Target are listed for each 200ms time window along with the approximate corresponding 
word in the instruction. Subjects and items t-tests comparing the two percentages and signiﬁcant 
differences between these switches are marked in bold.  These switches were not calculated once 
participants’ initial looks to the Target reached a ceiling of 70 percent.  
We found that at the onset of the quantifier, there was a Distractor preference in the shifts 
for the some trials, suggesting that participants had a visual preference for the total set prior to 
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Time from the onset of the quantifier Time from the onset of the quantifier Time from the onset of the quantifier Time from the onset of the quantifier Time from the onset of the quantifier Time from the onset of the quantifier Time from the onset of the quantifier Time from the onset of the quantifier Time from the onset of the quantifier Time from the onset of the quantifier Time from the onset of the quantifier
… has has some/two/all/three some/two/all/three some/two/all/three of the ice ice ...
-200ms -200ms 0ms 200ms 400ms 600ms 600ms 800ms 800ms 1000ms 1000ms
Some
8% vs. 15%;
t1(19)=0.85, 
p>.40; t2(15)
=0.20, p>.80
8% vs. 15%;
t1(19)=0.85, 
p>.40; t2(15)
=0.20, p>.80
5% vs. 17%;
t1(19)=2.21, 
p<.05;
t2(15)=1.36, 
p>.15
9% vs. 21%;
t1(19)=1.60, 
p<.10; t2(15)
=2.93, p<.05
12% vs. 13%;
t1(19)=0.17, 
p>.90; t2(15)
=0.42, p>.60
7% vs. 6%;
t1(19)=0.23, 
p>.80; t2(15)
=0.62, p>.60
7% vs. 6%;
t1(19)=0.23, 
p>.80; t2(15)
=0.62, p>.60
17% vs. 1%;
t1(19)=2.59, 
p<.05; t2(15)
=2.18, p<.05
17% vs. 1%;
t1(19)=2.59, 
p<.05; t2(15)
=2.18, p<.05
24% vs. 9%;
t1(19)=2.22, p<.05; t2
(15)=3.00, p<.01
24% vs. 9%;
t1(19)=2.22, p<.05; t2
(15)=3.00, p<.01
Two
16% vs. 14%;
t1(19)=0.28, 
p>.70; t2(15)
=0.31, p>.70
16% vs. 14%;
t1(19)=0.28, 
p>.70; t2(15)
=0.31, p>.70
14% vs. 8%;
t1(19)=0.85, 
p>.40; t2(15)
=1.10, p>.30
22% vs. 3%;
t1(19)=2.68, 
p<.05; t2(15)
=2.29, p<.05
24% vs. 3%;
t1(19)=3.48, 
p<.01; t2(15)
=2.33, p<.05
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
All
4% vs. 9%;
t1(19)=1.44, 
p>.15; t2(15)
=2.11, p<.10
4% vs. 9%;
t1(19)=1.44, 
p>.15; t2(15)
=2.11, p<.10
7% vs. 11%;
t1(19)=0.68, 
p>.50; t2(15)
=0.64, p>.50
32% vs. 11%;
t1(19)=2.51, 
p<.05; t2(15)
=3.34, p<.01
25% vs. 12%;
t1(19)=2.54, 
p<.05; t2(15)
=2.15, p<.05
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Three
11% vs. 7%;
t1(19)=0.77, 
p>.40; t2(15)
=0.11, p>.90
11% vs. 7%;
t1(19)=0.77, 
p>.40; t2(15)
=0.11, p>.90
13% vs. 8%;
t1(19)=1.27,p>.
20; t2(15)=1.43, 
p>.15
27% vs. 2%;
t1(19)=4.02, 
p<.01; t2(15)
=3.99, p<.01
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/Acalculating the implicature.2  In the following 200ms time window, we found a robust Target 
preference in shifts for two, all, and three but not for some.  This led to a significant Scale by 
Strength by Initial-fixation interaction from the 200ms (F1(1,16)=5.04,p<.05; F2(1,15)=7.33, p<.
05) through the 600ms window (F1(1,16)=5.00,p<.05; F2(1,15)=4.24,p<.10).  Critically in the 
800ms window, participants in the some trials were more likely to switch to the Target on the 
Distractor-initial trials than they were to switch to the Distractor on Target-initial trials.  This 
time window roughly corresponds to the onset of the ﬁnal noun and indicates that a Target 
preference emerged well after the onset of the phonological cues necessary for the scalar 
implicature.  These results suggest the presence of an extended period semantic analysis which 
proceeds the generation of this inference.3 
Discussion
This study provides evidence of the dynamic interplay between semantic and pragmatic 
processes during real-time comprehension.  We found that when lexical semantics is sufficient to 
identity a referent, disambiguation of the utterance is quite rapid.  However, when a pragmatic 
inference is required, reference resolution is substantially delayed.  Listeners initially access the 
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2 We believe that this pattern largely reflects differences in visual saliency across the different 
displays.  In the some trials, participants preferred to look at the character that has the unique 
item (the Distractor) over one that has the shared item (the Target) prior to the onset of the 
quantifier.  Qualitative patterns of this sort are also seen in prior studies with both adults (Huang 
& Snedeker, 2009a; Grodner et al., in press) and children (Huang & Snedeker, 2009b).  
Critically, this preference was short-lived and disappeared following the onset of the quantifier, 
suggesting that they reflect perusal of the display prior to an informative linguistic cue.  
3 Further evidence that this delay reﬂects initial semantic analysis of some comes from 
Experiment 3 in Huang and Snedeker (2009a).  Participants were able to immediately 
disambiguate the Target after quantiﬁer onset when a scalar implicature was not necessary for 
reference restriction, i.e., when the subset was contrasted with an empty set (girl-with-none-of-
the-socks).  This suggests that this current delay can be attributed to the initial unavailability of a 
necessary implicature for ruling on the total set.semantic meaning of some but fail to calculate the pragmatic inference until about 800ms after 
the requisite phonological input.  The pattern is rather remarkable given the preference for the 
scalar implicature in everyday communication and its robustness in our task.  
These findings bear on current debates in the theoretical literature on the nature of 
pragmatic inferences and their relation to semantic representations (Noveck & Sperber, 2007).  
Among the variety of post-Gricean pragmatic theories that have been developed, in one category 
are explanations favoring immediate scalar implicatures.  These include Neo-Gricean accounts 
suggesting that habitual application of these inferences causes the implicated meaning to be 
stored in the lexicon (Levinson, 2000) and more recent psycholinguistic accounts suggesting that 
some is polysemous between semantic and pragmatic interpretations (Degen, Reeder, Carbary, & 
Tanenhaus, 2009).  In another category are accounts that leave open the possibility of a delay 
between phonological input and pragmatic inference.  Prominent among these is Relevance 
theory which proposes that all inferences, including implicatures, are guided by a more general 
tradeoff between the possible gains associated with generating an inference and the amount of 
cognitive effort necessary to derive it (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995).  
Our data present a particular challenge to the automatic processes invoked by proposals of 
the first kind.  If scalar implicatures were lexicalized, then we would expect them to emerge as 
rapidly as semantic content.  Yet we found a delay of 600ms between the use of the lexically-
encoded upper-bound of two and the pragmatically inferred upper-bound of some.  Alternatively, 
it may be the case that the two readings of some are polysemous and that both meanings are 
initially activated but after a short delay only the contextually appropriate one persists (Swinney, 
1979; Tanenhaus, Leiman, & Seidenberg, 1979).  However, if the relative influence of each 
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14meaning was proportional to its frequency or contextual fit, then preference for the Target would 
still be more robust that for the Distractor since the subset is generally preferred in 
communication and was overwhelmingly preferred in our off-line task (see Methods).  Instead 
we found no evidence of a reliable Target preference during the first 800ms of the ambiguous 
region, suggesting that only the semantic meaning was initially available.
The presence of an on-line scalar implicature imposes constraints on the more open-ended 
processes invoked by Relevance theory (Carston, 1998).  One possibility is that the mechanisms 
that generate interpretations only retrieved the semantic meaning of some since an implicature 
was not relevant in a task where referents were lexically disambiguated by the end of the 
sentence.  Another possibility is that the listener automatically generated the inferred 
interpretation ﬁrst since it is the more typical interpretation of the term.  Yet neither of these 
alternatives neatly captures the initial delay between semantic activation and inferential 
processes found in our data.  To account for this pattern, the Relevance theory would need to 
predict that initial activation of the lower-bounded interpretation does not meet an internal 
standard of relevance which motivates subsequent generation of the implicature.  
Finally, how can we reconcile these results with evidence demonstrating that pragmatic 
processing inﬂuences interpretation early in comprehension (Tanenhaus et al., 1995; Altmann & 
Kamide, 2004)?  Clearly a complete synthesis awaits more data.  In the meantime, we simply 
note the utility of distinguishing between two types of semantic-pragmatic interactions: (1) Cases 
in which pragmatic constraints are in place before a particular word is uttered, inﬂuencing how 
this word is understood and incorporated into the analysis; (2) Cases in which the meaning of a 
given word is critical for triggering the pragmatic inference.  Many examples of the rapid 
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15pragmatic effects are phenomena of the ﬁrst kind and are compatible with standard models of 
language processing in which pre-existing top-down constraints shape the perception and 
interpretation of lower levels of linguistic analysis (Trueswell & Tanenhaus, 1994; Altmann, 
2001).  
In contrast, our study focuses on an important example of the second kind.  Under most 
linguistic analyses a scalar implicature arises because of the meaning of the scalar term.  
Consequently, it is unsurprising that access to this meaning must precede the calculation of the 
inference.  These results elucidate the nature of semantic and pragmatic interpretation by 
highlighting the relationship between these processes during real-time comprehension.  They 
extend Grice’s (1975) distinction between meaning and inference by demonstrating that the 
information provided by these distinct levels of interpretation becomes available at different 
moments during comprehension. In other words, some can be all and it cannot be all but just not 
at the same time.  
Semantics-pragmatics interface 16
16References
Altmann, G. M. (2001). The language machine: Psycholinguistics in review. British Journal of 
Psychology, 92, 129-170
Altmann, G. M., & Kamide, Y. (2004). Now you see it, now you don't: mediating the mapping 
between language and the visual world. In J. Henderson and F. Ferreira (eds.) The 
integration of language, vision and action. pp. 347-386. Psychology Press.
Bott, L. & Noveck, I. A. (2004). Some utterances are underinformative: The onset and time 
  course of scalar inferences. Journal of Memory and Language. 51(3), 437-457.
Breheny, R. (2009).  How pragmatic reasoning affects incremental utterance interpretation. 
Paper presented at the 2009 Experimental Pragmatics Conference.  Lyon, France.
Carston, R. (1998).  Informativeness, relevance and scalar implicature. In R. Carston and S. 
Uchida (eds.) Relevance Theory: Applications and implications. pp. 179-236. Amsterdam: 
John Benjamins.
Chierchia, G. (2004).  Scalar implicatures, polarity phenomena, and the syntax/pragmatics 
interface.  In A. Belletti (ed.), Belletti structures and beyond.  Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.   
Degen, J., Reeder, P., Carbary, K., & Tanenhaus, M. (2009).  Using a novel experimental 
paradigm to investigate the processing of scalar implicatures.  Paper presented at the 2009 
Experimental Pragmatics Conference.  Lyon, France.
De Neys, W., & Schaeken, W. (2007). When people are more logical under cognitive load: Dual 
task impact on scalar implicature. Experimental Psychology, 54, 128-133. 
Gadzar, G. (1979). Pragmatics: Implicature, presupposition and logical form. New York: 
Academic Press.  
Semantics-pragmatics interface 17
17Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In: Cole, P. & Morgan, J. L., (eds.), Syntax and 
	
 Semantics, vol. 3: Speech Acts, pp. 41-58. New York: Academic Press. 
Grodner, D., Klein, N., Carbary, K., & Tanenhaus, M. (in press). Experimental evidence for rapid 
interpretation of pragmatic ‘some.’  To appear in Cognition.  
Horn, L. (1989).  A natural history of negation.  Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.  
Huang, Y. & Snedeker, J. (2009a).  On-line interpretation of scalar quantiﬁers: Insight 
into the semantics-pragmatics interface.  Cognitive Psychology, 58, 376-415.
Huang, Y., & Snedeker, J. (2009b). Semantic meaning and pragmatic interpretation in ﬁve-year 
olds: Evidence from real time spoken language comprehension. Developmental Psychology, 
45(6), 1723-1739.
Levinson, S. (2000).  Presumptive meanings.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Matin, E., Shao, K.C. & Boff, K.R. (1993) Saccadic overhead: information processing time with 
  and without saccades. Perception & Psychophysics, 53(4), 372-380.
Noveck, I. A. & Posada, A. (2003). Characterizing the time course of an implicature: An evoked 
potentials study. Brain and Language, 85, 203-210.
Noveck, I. A. & Sperber, D. (2007).  The why and how of experimental pragmatics: The case of 
‘scalar inferences’.  In N. Burton-Roberts (Ed.) Advances in Pragmatics.  Basingstoke:  
Palgrave.  
Sedivy, J., Tanenhaus, M., Chambers, C., & Carlson, G. (1999). Achieving incremental semantic 
  interpretations through contextual representation. Cognition, 71, 109-147.
Snedeker, J. & Trueswell, J. C. (2004). The developing constraints on parsing decisions: The role 
  of lexical-biases and referential scenes in child and adult sentence processing. Cognitive 
  Psychology, 49, 238-299.  
Semantics-pragmatics interface 18
18Sperber, D. & Wilson, D.  (1986/1995). Relevance: Communication and Cognition.  Oxford: 
Blackwell.  
Swinney, D. (1979). Lexical access during sentence comprehension: (Re)consideration of 
context effects. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 18, 645-660.
Tanenhaus, M., Leiman, J., & Seidenberg, M. (1979).  Evidence for multiple stages in the 
processing of ambiguous words in syntactic contexts. Journal of Verbal Learning and 
Verbal Behavior, 18, 427-440.
Tanenhaus, M. K., Spivey-Knowlton, M., Eberhard, K., & Sedivy, J. (1995).  Integration of 
visual and linguistic information in spoken language comprehension.  Science, 268, 1632.  
Trueswell, J. & Tanenhaus, M. (1994). Toward a lexicalist framework of constraint-based 
syntactic ambiguity resolution. In C. Clifton and L. Frazier (eds.), Perspectives on sentence 
processing. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Tyler, L.K. and Wessels, J. (1983). Quantifying contextual contributions to word recognition 
processes. Perception & Psychophysics, 34, 409-420.
Semantics-pragmatics interface 19
19